tps crypt3 is hacked

although the infos circulate parmis the various people who code the firms that is not simple to make the modifications. In order to inform those which are not to it some explanations yet here never knows one by hoping that that can advance more quickly devellopement. Current operation of tps with list of aes tps currently uses 4 types of encryption - the preone (or preSE) - the encryption tpscrypte (or tps) - via 2.3 - the post-surencryption (or postSE) The large innovation consists in the introduction of new a algo to imply in the process the RC6 in the event. The preSE and the postSE can thus use maitenant 2 algos different: the RC6 or the AES the encryption tpscrytp being always in algo AES. the extracted list each day (tps.bin) contain cycles of key of approximately 6 minutes with 3 keys: Veiled has what resembles a file tps.bin after decoding 28/12/2006 04:20: 00 C8xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxA8 C8xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxA8 7BxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxFC 0201021C 28/12/2006 04:26: 00 67xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxF3 FCxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx16 9BxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxE5 0201021C - 1st key for the preSE - 2nd key for tpscrypte - 3rd key for the postSE like 3 flags - 1st for the preSE in algo RC6 (flag=2) or algo AES (flag=1) - 2nd for tpscrytpe always in algo AES (flag=1) - 3rd for the postSE in algo RC6 (flag=2) or algo AES (flag=1) if a flag is to 0 it does not have encryption of this type and 1 flag of authorization of désencryption for the 3 types: - bit 2 = 1 authorizes désencryption tpscrypte - bit 3 = 1 authorizes pre-désencryption - bit 4 = 1 authorizes post-désencryption generally this flag has 0x1C (3 authorized) thus when the demonstration recoit an original ecm is needed that this ecm forwards by the preSE, TPScrypte, via2.3 (managed by the usual charts), the postSE however it is there that tps has crafty one well indeed it is ecm itself which contains them types of désencryption to be made an original ecm resembles: 80 7m nn 00 D2 01 01 40 03 00 08 DF ww gh ij kl ..... with: 7m= 71 if odd screen 70 if even screen nn= length of the ecm D2 01 01 identifies tpscrypte (with suprimer) 40 03 trick tps (to be transformed into 90 03) 00 08 identifier provider and key in progress DF the nano DF: - ww length of the nano DF - gh used for “knowing” if a désencryption tpscrypte should be made (but if there were D20101 then in any event tpscrypte) - ij used for “knowing” if a désencryption preSE should be made - kl used for “knowing” if a désencryption postSE should be made (the operation for “knowing” is small a algorythme) Thus times one can have the 3 types, or 2, or 1 and cavity the keys are used into same to treat a ecm so much Algos RC6 and AES générent starting from the key a table of hash by which the ecm is xorée For the moment everyone uses the file tps.bin but the final solution do not owe flasher the every day is the extraction of the keyset which is currently sent by tps in stream on a well defined pid. Unfortunately there too tps has corser lately the system and sendings not only the keyset but also separately a régle has to use for the extraction of the keys this one is regularly to modify it is what poses problem actuellemet with demonstration FTE which before could extract the keyset automatically and to manage any Ca but maitenant as soon as the rules of extractions are to modify the fte nécéssite an update because the extracted keyset is not good. Veiled hope that that advances some can the schmilblik PS: Here a log of the process into live so that that is more visual still and has R **** and the others I always awaits a return of your share… Appearance of the hidden text > - LogPos= 680 -- 22:12: 37 ----- time file: 25.867 -- delta: 25.867 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : 67 3rd 01 09 50 C2 A0 7A 88 1A B1 06 2B 09 68 B7 F3 53 DA FC 14 9A EE cd. CD E0 5A B9 F8 24 71 1A 1E B5 36 28 DF > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: AC 1B E9 92 95 2B cd. 4B 6D DD 85 F2 C2 AA 9A > F0 08: 89 F7 1A CA DD FE 1B E1 < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2C673E01095046ACC2A07A881AB1062B1F0968B7F32C9C53 DAFC149AEEDCCDE05AB97CF824718C1A1EB53628DFE203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA10AC1BE992955F2BDC4B6DDD85 F2C2AA9AF00889F71ACADDFE1BE1 ispreSE mode: rc6 key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.578 > - LogPos= 1629 -- 22:12: 39 ----- time file: 28.555 -- delta: 0.109 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : 67 3rd 01 09 50 C2 A0 7A 88 1A B1 06 2B 09 68 B7 F3 53 DA FC 14 9A EE cd. CD E0 5A B9 F8 24 71 1A 1E B5 36 28 DF > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: AC 1B E9 92 95 2B cd. 4B 6D DD 85 F2 C2 AA 9A > F0 08: 89 F7 1A CA DD FE 1B E1 < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2C673E01095046ACC2A07A881AB1062B1F0968B7F32C9C53 DAFC149AEEDCCDE05AB97CF824718C1A1EB53628DFE203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA10AC1BE992955F2BDC4B6DDD85 F2C2AA9AF00889F71ACADDFE1BE1 ispreSE mode: rc6 key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.594 > - LogPos= 2578 -- 22:12: 44 ----- time file: 32.680 -- delta: 1.531 > CA F0 00 01 22 > 9th 20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 < 90 00 < --------------------------- execution time: 0.328 > - LogPos= 2842 -- 22:12: 44 ----- time file: 33.008 -- delta: 0.000 > CA 18 01 01 17 > A9 0B: 35 81 36 23 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 > F0 08: 73 AD A9 F 0A AB 8B < 90 00 < --------------------------- execution time: 0.172 > - LogPos= 3080 -- 22:12: 46 ----- time file: 34.609 -- delta: 1.430 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : 80 FF 20 8B C7 D8 AB A1 26 2B 41 F6 41 16 5th 1D E1 64 8th 4D 70 E3 54 DD C9 B3 D8 A8 63 79 F7 94 13 F4 BB 56 24 A3 E1 49 01 > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: 2D 8th 7D DE F8 6B 3D 72 51 78 36 A2 90 C2 18 > F0 08: F5 B7 19 C8 87 6B BF < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2C80FF208BC7D8ABA1262B41F641165E1DE1648E3C7C2C4D 70E354DDC9B3D8A86379F79413F4BB5624A3E14901E203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA102D8E7DDEF86B3D72517836A2 909CC218F008F5B719C8871F6BBF istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.578 > - LogPos= 3971 -- 22:12: 56 ----- time file: 44.656 -- delta: 7.469 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : 15 0B 52 70 B1 48 AD 98 F9 40 93 39 6A AB 97 DC B4 4A 50 EF A0 D9 54 A2 9A EF 07 BE 45 F9 F8 21 27 61 1D DF 32 B3 43 2A 95 D4 > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: 3B A0 cd. 93 62 EB 5D EC. CB 10 E3 cd. 1A B0 E9 > F0 08: FD 98 34 F1 42 02 65 6B < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2C150B5270B148AD98F94093396AAB97CCB44A50EFA0D954 A29AEF07BE45F9F82127611DDF326CB3432A951CD4E203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA103BA0DC9362EB8C5DECCB10E3 DC1AB0E9F008FD9834F14202656B ispreSE mode: rc6 key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.633 > - LogPos= 4920 -- 22:13: 06 ----- time file: 54.758 -- delta: 7.469 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : 16 B4 3rd FD MINOR ROAD 08 5D EF 37 17 E0 4th 52 F1 C0 95 57 28 69 55 E2 28 1D 76 A0 2D 24 9D E0 20 E6 0D A2 63 42 EB 02 D3 54 5A 05 7th > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: 89 data bases 17 3D 62 DD FD 4B ED B3 F7 D4 6D 1A 49 > F0 08: 4B EC 10 6A C0 E3 D0 94 < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2C16B43EFDCD085DEF3717E09C4E52F1C09557286955E228 1D76A02D249DE020E60DA28C6342EB02D3545A057EE203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA1089BD173D621FDDFD4BEDB3F7 D46D1A49F0084BCE106AC0E3D094 istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.594 > - LogPos= 5811 -- 22:13: 16 ----- time file: 64.867 -- delta: 7.516 > CA 88 00 08 59 > DF : B9 80 3D FF 55 B6 19 23 1E AA BE MINOR ROADS 77 42 C7 F7 41 90 10 0E B1 E9 E8 46 C0 Data base F7 BE 94 16 D6 8B 08 9D 18 B8 DF A7 6th B3 > E2 03: 35 9B 00 > E2 03: 35 9B 05 > E2 03: 35 9B 07 > EA 10: E4 03 4B 5A 62 80 B3 CA EC 24 C0 94 50 22 > F0 08: 7th 20 data bases 1B D1 F2 8A < 28 => Bad sign Card asking for DCW: Provider 1 TPScrypt 007C0# Key 8 ECM: DF2CB9803D8FFF55B619231EAABECD7742C7F74190100EB14F E9E846C00FBDF7BE94169CD68B089D18B8DFA76EB3E203359B 00E203359B05E203359B07EA10E4034B5A6280B3CACE24C094 508F223FF0087E2C20BD1BD1F28A ispreSE mode: rc6 key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F istps mode: aes key 05A3484212B5B0B8ABFF7F910181052F ispostSE mode: aes key 9AAE43B754B70080E0D8C562F82D1304 Identity channel: TF1 < 90 40 < --------------------------- execution time: 2.578 > - LogPos= 6760 -- 22:13: 18 ----- time file: 67.445 -- delta: 0.000 > CA F0 00 01 22 > 9th 20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 < 90 00 < --------------------------- execution time: 0.391 > - LogPos= 7024 -- 22:13: 19 ----- time file: 67.836 -- delta: 0.000 > CA 18 01 01 16 > A9 0A: 35 81 36 23 80 00 00 00 00 00 > F0 08: 37 60 F 87 56 72 95 E7 < 90 00 < --------------------------- execution time: 0.164




Enjoy


fida-layyah
HELP LINE 24 HOURES
Mob:0301-7851633 /0302-7845805
MOb;0334-6945711/0333-5356235
MOb;0346-7593180/0307-7510610
contect : [email protected]
_________________